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WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
ownership, and the price paid was found to represent the full
market value at the time. Although the words of a deed may be
superseded by information on a map in accordance with the intent
of the parties, the present facts disclosed no such data. Further-
more, there was affixed to the document the United States reve-
nue stamp for a deed of sale whereas no such stamp would have
been necessary for a deed conveying only a servitude. The fact
that under Section 3369 the police jury would have acquired
only a servitude became irrelevant when the proceedings under
that statute were dropped by reason of the voluntary conveyance.
SALES
J. Denson Smith*
The court was called upon to consider the effectiveness of an
out-of-state conditional sales contract in Cobb v. Davidson.1 The
decision of the court of appeal that held the transaction ineffec-
tive in Louisiana on the ground that the evidence did not estab-
lish lack of knowledge on the part of the vendor and assignee of
removal from the State of Texas, where the transaction occurred,
was reversed. The supreme court took the view that the burden
of proving knowledge of removal was on the defendant as a
special affirmative defense. The decisions of the supreme court
have heretofore recognized the effectiveness of foreign conditional
sales except when to the knowledge of the seller at the time of
the transaction the property is being bought for removal to Loui-
siana. In the instant case the court seems to have accepted the
view expressed earlier in lower court opinions that the vendor's
protection is destroyed also if he has knowledge of the subsequent
removal of the thing sold. Perhaps the present case will not be
considered conclusive on the point.
Another conditional sales contract came before the court in
Lee Construction Company v. L. M. Ray Construction Corpora-
tion.2 The court relied on the Barber case3 to the effect that the
distinction between a lease with an option to purchase and a sale
is that in the latter the vendee promises to pay a price while in
the former he merely has an option to pay. It found a so-called
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 219 La. 434, 53 So. 2d 225 (1951).
2. 219 La. 246, 52 So. 2d 841 (1951).
3. Barber Asphalt & Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 152, 46
So. 193 (1908).
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lease-purchase agreement to constitute an invalid conditional
sale and therefore sustained an exception of no cause of action
aimed at the plaintiff's attempt to recover rentals plus damages
to the machine covered by the agreement.
In Samuelson v. Bosk 4 a contract for the purchase and sale of
real estate was enforced against the purchaser by forfeiture of
the deposit as provided in the contract. The defendant's argu-
ment that the agreement had never become binding was rejected
and properly so.
The court merely allowed recovery of the value of a building
erected by the plaintiff on a lot repossessed by the defendant
vendor in Smith v. Atkins.5 It rejected the defendant's claim for
the balance due on the purchase price plus interest and taxes, in
view of the fact that defendant had exercised a contract option
to re-sell the lot and declare forfeited as liquidated damages
payments previously made. The question of the reasonableness
of the forfeiture was not raised.
The public records doctrine was applied by the court in
Meraux v. R. R. Barrow, Incorporated," to support the holding
that a vendee is not bound by the provisions of a prior unrecorded
instrument to which the vendor was a party. The court also found
that a family holding corporation could not use the screen of
corporate entity to exclude the rights of the estate of a co-grantee.
An attempt of counsel for the defendant to connect a prior
writing containing a condition with a subsequent agreement
which was unconditional failed in Quarles v. Lewis.7 The court
also held that parol evidence was not admissible to establish a
condition not made part of the written agreement. A rehearing
had apparently been granted but it was dismissed by agreement
of counsel.
A problem of interpretation was resolved in Standard Oil
Company of New Jersey v. Evans.8 The court's appreciation of
the intention of the transferor of a mineral interest was clearly
supported by the language employed and the surrounding circum-
stances. The cases of White v. Wallace9 and Calumet Refining
Company v. Great National Oil Corporation'o presented only
4. 219 La. 477, 53 So. 2d 239 (1951).
5. 218 La. 1, 48 So. 2d 101 (1950).
6. 219 La. 309, 52 So. 2d 863 (1951).
7. 219 La. 194, 52 So. 2d 713 (1951).
8. 218 La. 590, 50 So. 2d 203 (1950).
9. 218 La. 931, 51 So. 2d 489 (1951).
10. 218 La. 944, 51 So. 2d 585 (1951).
[VOL. XII
WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
questions of fact. The court found no reason to .disturb the con-
clusions reached by the trial courts.
SUCCESSIONS, DONATIONS AND
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Harriet S. Daggett*
In the Succession of Combre,1 since decedent and his family
had continued in possession after an act of sale reciting a cash
consideration, the presumption of simulation placed the burden of
proof upon the alleged vendee to show that consideration had
been paid. Since this burden was not sustained, the administrator
of the succession secured the annulment of the act of sale.
In the Succession of Montegut2 the will of Amelie Montegut
contained a clause of doubtful meaning; and after consideration
by the supreme court, the case was remanded in order that evi-
dence might be heard bearing upon the intention of the testatrix.3
It was indicated that a presumption prevails that a testator intends
to dispose of all property. When this case again reached the su-
preme court, the majority took the position that this presumption
is not as strong in the jurisprudence as is the preference in case
of ambiguity for following as closely as possible the legal order
of distribution. Upon rehearing the court adhered to the judg-
ment on first hearing after the remand, particularly since the
extrinsic evidence adduced did not convincingly -disclose the
intention of the testatrix.
In Gregory v. Hardwick4 a testatrix made the following
bequest: "I hereby will and bequeath all the rights, title and
interest which I may have in any property whatsoever in equal
proportions, share and share alike to" four named persons. The
court found this provision to be a universal legacy under Article
1606 and Shane and Withers v. Withers' Legatees,5 rather than a
legacy under universal title. Thus, seizin was given to these
legatees under Articles 1609 and 884, and they had a right of
action for an accounting and other relief against decedent's hus-
band. Moreover, the testamentary executrix, one of the legatees,
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 217 La. 955, 47 So. 2d 734 (1950).
2. 217 La. 1023, 47 So. 2d 898 (1949) (rehearing 1950).
3. Succession of Montegut, 211 La. 112, 29 So. 2d 583 (1947).
4. 218 La. 346, 49 So. 2d 423 (1950).
5. 8 La. 489 (1835).
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